Hello, this is Lu. Thanks for dropping by! I am an Associate Professor at SUSTech Business School, Shenzhen, China. I use behavioral game theory and experimental methods to understand people's decisions in economic interactions.
Contact: donglu(at)sustech(dot)edu(dot)cn Below is a list of my publications: Publications Abbink, K., Dong, L., Huang, L., 2023 "Preventive War" Games and Economic Behavior 142:552–69 (Paper Website; Download the PDF) Abbink, K., Dong, L., Huang, L., 2022 "Talking Behind Your Back: Communication and Team Cooperation." Management Science 68(7):5187-5200 (Paper Website; Download the PDF) Abbink, K., Dong, L., Huang, L., 2021 "Arms Race and Conflict: Experimental Evidence" The Economic Journal, 131(637): 1883-1904 (Paper Website; Download the PDF) Dong, L., Falvey, R., Luckraz, S., 2019 "Fair share and social efficiency: a mechanism in which peers decide on the payoff division" Games and Economic Behavior, 115, 209-224. (Paper Website; Download the PDF) (based on the second chapter of my Ph.D. thesis) Dong, L. and Huang, L., 2019 "Is there no 'I' in team? Strategic effects in dynamic team competition" Journal of Economic Psychology, 75, 102070. (Paper Website; Download the PDF) Dong, L. and Huang, L., 2018 "Favoritism and Fairness in Teams" Games, 9(3),65 (Paper Website; Download the PDF) Dong, L., Montero, M., Possajennikov, A., 2017 "Communication, Leadership and Coordination Failure" Theory and Decision, 84(4), 557-584. (Paper Website; Download the PDF) (based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis) Working Papers Dong, L., Huang, L. Lien, J., Zheng, J., 2023 "How Alliances Form and Conflict Ensues" Accepted with minor revision in Games and Economic Behavior. Abstract: In a social network in which friendly and rival bilateral links can be formed, how do alliances between decision-makers form, and what determines whether a conflict will arise? We study a network formation game between ex-ante symmetric players in the laboratory to examine the dynamics of alliance formation and conflict evolution. A peaceful equilibrium yields the greatest social welfare, while a successful bullying attack transfers the victimized player’s resources evenly to the attackers at a cost. Consistent with the theoretical model predictions, peaceful and bullying outcomes are prevalent among the randomly re-matched experimental groups, based on the cost of attack. We further examine the dynamics leading to the final network and find that groups tend to coordinate quickly on a first target for attack, while the first attacker entails a non-negligible risk of successful counter-attack by initiating the coordination. These findings provide insights for understanding social dynamics in group coordination. Dong, L., Huang, L. Lien, J., 2023 "They Never Had a Chance: Unequal Opportunities and Fair Redistributions" Review and Resubmit in The Economic Journal. Abstract: A meritocratic fairness ideal is generally believed to regard income inequality as fair if it stems from performance differentials rather than luck. In this study, we present experimental evidence showing that merit judgments are shaped by the source of performance differentials while holding fixed the underlying impact on willingness to perform. Inspired by real-world phenomena which generate inequality, we investigate two types of unequal opportunities that impact performance: educational quality and employment opportunity. Contrary to some previous findings that merit judgements are often insensitive to unequal circumstances, we find that individuals are more inclined to split resources equally when the performance differential involves either type of unequal opportunity. We also find that when participants were given the option to expend personal effort to reveal information about the presence of unequal opportunity, a substantial number of them declined to do so, but held optimistic beliefs about the social norm of seeking such information. These findings enrich our understanding of the factors that lead individuals to support income redistribution, while also obtaining an assessment regarding to what degree redistributing third-party decision-makers are vested in these choices. |